JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Nearly all social movements divide into "moderate" and "radical" factions at some point in their development, although the meaning of these labels is continually changing. Bifurcation has occurred, for example, in the U. An understanding of radical flank effects would greatly enhance current social movement theory.' The literature on social and political movements abounds with more or less casual references to these effects, and they have been frequently debated by movement activists; but they have received almost no systematic attention. Gamson's (1975) research represents the most direct investigation of the effects of factionalism on protest outcomes. He examined the conditions under which groups came to represent a set of constituents and managed to gain "new advantages" for those constituents. Among the many conditions Gamson examined was.the existence of moderate and radical groups championing the same broad issues. He tested -and rejectedthe hypothesis that the existence of more militant organizations enhanced the success of less militant organizations. Gamson's test is less than conclusive for several reasons. There were measur-
competing varieties of collective action. Though theoretically important, this issue has received little attention from sociologists and political scientists. This paper addresses these topics by examining changes in the funding of civil rights organizations in the United States during the late 1950s and the 1960s -a period when portions of the black movement were becoming increasingly militant in both their goals and their tactics. The paper begins with a discussion of the sparse literature dealing with the effects of radical factions on moderate groups. Following this brief review, I will describe the escalation of the goals and tactics of organized black activists during the twentieth century. I will then present and discuss data on the funding of civil rights organizations during the period from 1957 through 1970. Although white reactions to black collective action during those turbulent times were diverse, these data will show that radicalization of segments of the black community had the net effect of improving the resource bases of more moderate civil rights organizations by stimulating previously uninvolved parties to contribute ever increasing amounts of financial support.
1. Radical flank effects are relevant, for example, to the debate between the resource mobilization model of protest and that of Piven and Cloward (1977, 1978) . The resource mobilization perspective stresses the dependence of protest groups on the resources available from third parties (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Lipsky, 1968) . Implicit in this model is the notion that protest groups must refrain from tactics and statements which would alienate prospective supporters. Piven and Cloward, on the other hand, suggest that reliance on such resources only undermines protest goals and that protest groups can succeed by tactics of mass disruption. Positive radical flank effects in protest movements provide a link between the two; under certain circumstances, moderate groups might well be able to maintain good relations with supporting groups by distancing themselves from the disruptive activities of radicals while at the same time profiting from the crises that they create. ment and coding problems (Goldstone, 1980) . He examined only 30 groups. Labor unions were over-represented in the sample. And, most important, he focused upon only two dimensions of reactions to moderate organizations: (1) the designation of a group as a legitimate representative for a group of constituents; and (2) the group's success in winning significant benefits for its constituents. While these dimensions are important, a number of others remain to be examined. Radical groups might, for example, increase or decrease the level of public awareness of moderate groups. They might alter public definitions of moderates as more or less "extreme," "reasonable," or "dangerous." Radicals might increase or decrease moderates' access to decisionmakers. And, finally, radical flank effects might influence the capacity of moderate groups to attract resources from supporters who are not members of the moderate groups themselves. This paper focuses upon the last of these dimensions.
THE BLACK REVOLT IN THE UNITED STATES
The black revolt in the United States after the Second World War is well-suited for studying radical flank effects because it involved a variety of organizations, ideologies, and strategies, and has experienced rapid tactical and rhetorical escalation, especially during the 1960s. This section briefly traces the escalation of black insurgency, highlighting those movement transformations upon which radical flank effects were based.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was the preeminent organizational representative of black interests in the United States from its incorporation in 1910 to the Supreme Court's landmark school desegregation decision in 1954. Other organizations existed, such as the National Urban League, the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (renamed the Southern Regional Council in 1944), and Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association. But none of these matched the NAACP in long-term influence. The NAACP functioned mainly as a legal group; its primary tactic was litigation. Initially, the NAACP did not challenge legalized racial segregation and discrimination. Well into the 1930s it aimed to ensure equality of rights and facilities under the "separate but equal" doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), rather than to attack the doctrine outright. During the 1930s, however, this goal changed. The NAACP launched a protracted campaign of litigation, culminating in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954), in which the Supreme Court invalidated segregation in public schools. Thereafter, the nature of the black revolt was fundamentally transformed.
Prior to 1954, many groups in the United States periodically defined and attacked the NAACP as a radical organization. This was especially true in the southern states, where many blacks also regarded the NAACP's approach to racial justice as militant. The NAACP's integrationist philosophy and program of aggressive litigation was rather "radical" in those times.
When white resistance prevented the kinds of sweeping changes that many blacks expected the Supreme Court's desegration ruling to produce, the movement changed. During the mid 1960s the predominance of nonviolent integrationism broke down, and militancy was transformed once again. As violence erupted in the black ghettos of northern cities and as many black activists began questioning the assimilationist orientation of the civil rights movement, leaders such as Martin Luther King and organizations such as the SCLC were increasingly defined as moderate or, at the very least, as "responsible" militants (Meier, 1965:55) . Real militancy came to imply a separatist or nationalist outlook and an acceptance of retaliatory violence against an intransigent white power structure. One should not overgeneralize, for there were indeed several different types of black radicalism during the mid 1960s (Allen, 1969) . Nevertheless, most black radicals rejected racial integration and strict nonviolence to some degree. Major proponents of the "new" black radicalism after 1966 were the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Black Panther Party, the Revolutionary Action Movement, the Republic of New Africa, and, to a far lesser extent, the Congress of Racial Equality.
While it is clear that black moderation and radicalism evolved during the 1950s and 1960s, students of black collective action are divided over its effects on the civil rights mainstream. It is probably impossible to settle this debate in any conclusive manner; it relates to a multidimensional issue, and both positions undoubtedly contain at least a grain of truth. No scholar, however, has yet examined organizational funding patterns in light of radical flank effects.
THE IMPORTANCE OF OUTSIDE RESOURCES
Prior to the 1970s, most scholars tried to explain the emergence of collective action in terms of participants' motives. But as theoretical and empirical problems have emerged in such explanations (Gurney and Tierney, 1982; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; McAdam, 1982) , scholars began focusing on the organizational needs of social movements -especially the need to mobilize material and non-material resources (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Lipsky, 1968; McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977) . Since many aggrieved populations lack the resources necessary to wage large-scale collective challenges, resources obtained from outside supporters are frequently essential. The utility of the resource mobilization perspective is still being debated (McAdam, 1982:23) , but it has been rather firmly established that organized conflict cannot operate for long on shared discontent and moral commitment alone. Thus, an understanding of processes which affect a movement organization's ability to mobilize resources would be useful. Unfortunately, resource mobilization theorists have had rather little to say on this subject (McAdam, 1982:21 While it would be a mistake to equate resources solely with money, I believe money can serve as a convenient index of radical flank effects. I assume that outside supporters contribute money or other resources only to those movement organizations which they consider acceptable. Supporters need not totally approve of the organization to contribute to it. Rather, they need only have a perceived interest in supporting the cause and they need only define the movement organization as an acceptable beneficiary. I also assume that acceptability is a relative thing. 5. I used different approaches to determining outside income for each organization. The National Urban League provided yearly income totals derived from several categories of donors, including "affiliates dues," "special events," and "other." I eliminated these three categories, leaving only income derived from strictly external sources. Income for the Southern Regional Council was taken directly from financial reports supplied by the SRC and the Atlanta University Archives. SRC figures appearing in Table 1 Two characteristics of the data in Table 1 These changes in organizational shares of total movement income may be understood largely in terms of shifts in major sources of funding which took place during the 1960s. Unpublished analyses I have made of the data on which this paper is based (Haines, 1983 (Haines, , 1984 suggest that elite contributors became vastly more important money sources for moderate black organizations during the second half of the decade. Among these elite contributors were corporations, foundations, and the federal government. methods of fundraising, I think I can safely assume that little error results from treating all of its income as exogenous. I have done so for the most part, although funds of a clearly internal nature have been eliminated from the data when identified. The Congress of Racial Equality's financial records make it difficult to distinguish accurately between income from internal and external sources. In most cases, for example, local CORE chapters were not set apart from other, non-CORE organizations, and their meager contributions to national CORE's coffers were simply lumped into the "organizations" category. Nevertheless, CORE chapters were notorious for their reluctance to contribute to the national office, so little is lost, I believe, in subtracting convention income, sales, and the like from outside income. Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee records are even less specific than those of CORE, and I used a nearly identical procedure to determine SNCC's outside income. 6. The characterization of the 1950s trend as relatively constant suffers, of course, from my lack of an absolute baseline. While I lack estimates of the incomes of the National Urban League and the NAACP for 1952, I believe it is reasonable to estimate total movement outside income for that year is not more than $450,000 ( Table 1 ). Assuming that this were true, the proportionate increase between 1952 and 1957 would have been nearly 83 percent. Such a growth rate over six years is not inconsiderable, yet the total amounts are so small in comparison to later years that the increases seem unspectacular. Corporations were rather slow in becoming supporters of black collective action, but their involvement grew as the movement entered its nonviolent collective action phase around 1960. But business contributions became truly large only after successive summers of urban rioting (Cohn, 1970) . While several black organizations benefitted from corporate donations after 1967 (Cohn, 1970:73) , the National Urban League provides perhaps the best illustration. In 1962, such contributions amounted to only $153,000. By 1970, they had risen to $1,973,000 (Haines, 1984:18) . Similarly, Cohn (1970) reports that the NAACP received considerable amounts from corporate sources after 1967, but I can provide no independent verification of this due to the lack of such information in its Annual Reports.
Foundations also played an increased role in funding black organizations during the 1960s. As the black struggles of the 1960s progressed and as the militancy of the black population grew, foundation contributions became major sources of income for the National Urban League, the Southern Regional Council, and the Legal Defense and Educational Fund -all moderate organizations. In 1970, these three received an estimated total of $7,143,534 in foundation gifts, up from $1,461,264 in 1964 (Haines, 1984:23) . Not only was more money directed by foundations to moderate black groups as the decade wore on, but more foundations became involved and a much higher number of individual grants were made. On all of these dimensions, the increases in foundation involvement in funding black collective action and related activities far outpaced the overall expansion of foundation activity which occurred during the same time span (Haines, 1984:30-32) .
One of the moderate organizations, the National Urban League, became the recipient of large amounts of federal government money during the late 1960s. While these funds were for NULrun programs for the disadvantaged, not "contributions" in the conventional sense of the word, they were nevertheless unique among the seven major organizations and deserve to be mentioned. No federal money was channeled through the NUL until 1965. During that year, the League received $294,000 from the U.S. government. By 1970, the total had risen to $6,913,000, and it topped $13,000,000 in 1970.
DISCUSSION
The most significant finding of the study is the dramatic increase in the level of outside funding for the civil rights movement as a whole during the 1960s (Table 1) . Little increase in outside funding took place during the 1950s, when black radicalism was largely equated with litigation aimed at integration and when nonviolent protest was rare. But as nonviolent action became more frequent and intense during the early 1960s, outside funding accelerated. The year during which nonviolent direct action seems to have reached its dramatic zenith, 1963 (Burstein, 1979:169; Carson, 1981:90) , was also the year of the steepest climb in outside income (Table 2) . Outside supporters, it seems, were "discovering" civil rights. Income continued to climb until 1966, when it dropped for the first time. This was the year during which Stokely Carmichael of SNCC popularized the black power slogan. Ghetto rioting continued during the summer, drawing media attention. The income slump of 1966 probably reflected a decline in white support due to controversy surrounding the movement. It was, however, only a temporary setback for the movement as a whole. Total outside income resumed its upward spiral during the late 1960s. In fact, yearly proportionate increases for 1969 and 1970 surpassed all other years except 1963 (Table 2) . In dollar amounts, these increases were unprecedented. Thus, it was clear that urban violence and black power did not have a negative radical flank effect, at least when measured by outside funding. On the contrary, the data suggest that there was a positive radical flank effect.
During the 1960s, and especially after 1966, three moderate organizations -the National Urban League, the Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the NAACP-received increasingly greater shares of the movement's total outside funding. Not only did these three organizations suffer no financial backlash in the turbulent years of rioting and black nationalism, but their outside incomes rose more rapidly than ever before. The most moderate of the groups, the National Urban League, received a late-1960s windfall that was nothing less than astounding. Together, the NUL, the LDEF, and the NAACP accounted for all of the aggregate increases in combined movement income by the end of the 1960s. The radical organizations, on the other hand, received rapid increases in outside income during the early 1960s followed by equally rapid declines during the era of the new militancy.
McAdam ( vast increases in the incomes of moderate groups. 3. The increased income of the moderate groups did not result from a mere reallocation of a fixed sum of resources within the movement. Rather, it involved the injection of large amounts of new money into the moderate groups. Most of this new money came from elite white groups, which became increasingly important sponsors of moderate civil rights activity. These findings suggest that positive radical flank effects contributed significantly to increases in the outside funding of moderate civil rights organizations in the 1960s. The increasing importance of corporations, foundations, and the federal government, moreover, suggests that a portion of the nation's corporate elite recognized that it had a crucial interest in pacifying the black population, particularly in the volatile cities, and in accommodating certain manageable black demands. It also suggests that many previously uninvolved groups were "enlightened" by the glow of burning cities, after years of indifference to nonviolent cajoling by the National Urban League and the NAACP. Some whites came to realize that the integration of blacks into the U.S. mainstream was not such a bad idea after all, that it was in their own best interests given the more radical alternatives, and that it was something they ought to be encouraging with their resources. The prime beneficiaries of such changes of heart were the big moderate groups, the very organizations that had become most concerned with an impending white backlash. Certainly, a white backlash did occur. But the data presented in this paper suggest that, beneath it all, there was occurring an important acceptance and facilitation of "reasonable" black activism and that the effort would not have been made without the progressive radicalization of large numbers of blacks in the United States.
This conclusion suggests a new question: are radical flank effects unique features of the black revolt, or might they be overlooked but critical factors in numerous social movements? I strongly suspect that they affected the course of the U.S. labor movement, and they may have been involved in the ill-fated campaign for the Equal Rights Amendment. The difficulties in identifying positive and negative radical flank effects with confidence are considerable. Financial data, which serves as a measure of only one limited dimension, may be difficult to find for other movements. But these difficulties are not insurmountable, and if we are to understand collective action more completely, we need to carry on the search for evidence of radical flank effects.
